

Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 177711

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO US CW PRESENTATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 85198; (B) STATE 128632; (C) GENEVA 5502

1. SOVIET EMBASSY HAS PROVIDED DEPARTMENT WITH PAPER
IN RUSSIAN RESPONDING TO US PRESENTATIONS ON CW MADE
BILATERALLY IN GENEVA APRIL 9 (REF A) AND IN WASHINGTON
MAY 21 (REF B). (DEPARTMENT LANGUAGE SERVICES TRANSLATION
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OF PAPER PROVIDED BELOW). US CCD DEL AND EMBASSY MOSCOW
MAY INFORM SOVIETS THAT WE ARE STUDYING USSR RESPONSE
AND WILL PROVIDE US REACTIONS AS SOON AS THAT BECOMES
POSSIBLE. WE ALSO WILL REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO

SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT US AND SOVIET DELS HOLD CONSULTATIONS, WITH PARTICIPATION OF EXPERTS, DURING CCD SUMMER SESSION.

2. TRANSLATION OF SOVIET PAPER FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT. THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT IN THE INTEREST OF ACHIEVING REAL PROGRESS ON THE ROAD TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE TO PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF ANY KIND WITHOUT EXCEPTION, AND TO DESTROY

EXISTING STOCKS. THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION THAT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE USSR AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FOR ITS CONSIDERATION IN MARCH 1972 EXPRESSES PRECISELY THIS FUNDAMENTAL POSITION.

ALREADY DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DRAFT CONVENTION IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1972 TO 1974, THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST DECLARED THAT THEY WERE NOT READY TO UNDERTAKE A COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS THE QUESTION OF A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AT HAND CAME UP, MEANING THAT FIRST THE MOST DANGEROUS (HIGHLY TOXIC) CHEMICAL AGENTS WOULD BE PROHIBITED AND THAT SUBSEQUENTLY A PROHIBITION OF ALL REMAINING CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE WOULD BE EFFECTED.

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS AND IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING THAT WAS ACHIEVED IN THE COURSE OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN 1974, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED THE CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION CONCERNING HIHGLY TOXIC CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE DURING THE FIRST CONFIDENTIAL

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STAGE; A DRAFT OF SUCH A CONVENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE U.S. SIDE ON AUGUST 6, 1974 WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS THE PROHIBITION OF SUCH AGENTS THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO A COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

DURING TRANSMISSION OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET SIDE REPEATEDLY ADVANCED THE SUGGESTION THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BE HELD TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE LANGUAGE OF A JOINT DRAFT; UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE THE U.S. SIDE HAS BEEN UNREADY TO PROCEED IN THIS MANNER, SUCH CONSULTATIONS HAVE NOT TAKEN PLACE TO DATE.

AS EVIDENCED BY THE DOCUMENTS THAT WERE TRANSMITTED TO US IN APRIL/MAY OF 1976, THE U.S. SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT "THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAS BEEN THE INABILITY SO FAR TO FIND AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION IN THE AREA OF CONTROL." (TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: THIS QUOTE IS A RE-TRANSLATION FROM THE RUSSIAN, AND MAY DIFFER FROM THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH.) THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS POSITION AND CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE ONCE AGAIN ITS POSITION WITH REGARD

TO THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AND CONTROL.

WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING THE MOST PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION, IT SEEMS ADVISABLE TO USE THE CRITERION OF GENERAL PURPOSE, BASED ON THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE CHEMICAL AGENTS ARE INTENDED, THAT IS, A PROHIBITION MUST BE IMPOSED ON CHEMICAL AGENTS OF SUCH TYPES AND IN SUCH QUANTITIES THAT ARE NOT INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION MUST, IN OUR VIEW, BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A SPECIFIC CRITERION--THAT OF TOXICITY. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TOXICITY CRITERION AND THE FORM IN WHICH IT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED COULD BE AGREED UPON IN THE COURSE OF OUR SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL CONTACTS.

IN OUR OPINION, FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT
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WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE TO PROHIBIT CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WITH AN LCT50 TOXICITY EQUAL TO 1500 MG. MIN/CUB.METER. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. SIDE INDICATED APPROXIMATELY THIS VALUE AS A BORDERLINE BETWEEN THE HIGHLY TOXIC AND OTHER TOXIC CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE. OBVIOUSLY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCREASE THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITED CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES UP TO AN LCT50 LEVEL EQUAL TO 20,000 MG. MIN/CUB. METER, WHICH WAS ALSO INDICATED BY THE U.S. SIDE. HOWEVER, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES. IN ATTEMPTING TO FACILITATE REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION, THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS IT POSSIBLE NOT TO GIVE THE EXACT NUMERICAL VALUE OF THE TOXICITY OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION AT THIS STAGE, AND IS PREPARED TO EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS OF THE U.S. SIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC VALUE OF THE TOXICITY CRITERION.

WITH REGARD TO THE TYPES OF ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION, WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY UPON SIMULTANEOUS

REJECTION OF DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND DESTRUCTION OF ACCUMULATED STOCKS. THE IDEA PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE ON THE STEP-BY-STEP PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF ACTIVITY GIVES RISE TO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. THE PROPOSAL OF THE U.S. SIDE TO DECREASE THE STOCK OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO THE AGREED LEVELS WITHOUT LIMITING THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH SUBSTANCES LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR MODERNIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT RE-EQUIPPING OF ARMIES. THE OTHER PROPOSALS

RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, WHILE FULLY OR PARTIALLY PRESERVING THE STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ARE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE, IF THEY WERE REALIZED, IT WOULD BE UNJUST TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT HAVE STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SINCE THEY WOULD BE PUT IN AN UNEQUAL POSITION IN COMPARISON WITH STATES WHICH
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HAVE ALREADY ACCUMULATED SUCH STOCKS. THUS, THE STEP-BY-STEP MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE WOULD NOT LEAD TO A BALANCED SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND WOULD NOT FULLY PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN 1974.

SINCE THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY, QUESTIONS OF CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THESE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED IN A COMPREHENSIVE WAY. AS THE AMERICAN SIDE ADMITS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER SPECIFIC TYPES OF THESE ACTIVITIES IS VERY DIFFICULT OR EVEN IMPOSSIBLE. THEREFORE, THE BASIC FORM OF CONTROL OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SOME FORM OF NATIONAL CONTROL. THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS THAT THE VERY FACT OF PARTICIPATION BY A STATE IN SUCH A CONVENTION IS A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE THAT THAT STATE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS JURISDICTION OR CONTROL, WILL PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION BY NATIONAL MEANS. IN DISCUSSING THE PROVISIONS ON CONTROL WHICH ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE, WE SHOULD, ON THE WHOLE, BE GUIDED BY A POSITIVE PRECEDENT--THE WORDINGS OF THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIC WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION.

THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE METHODS OF

VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS
COULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE
THE POSSIBILITY OF USING IT IN CERTAIN CASES, ONCE IT HAS
BEEN MORE THOROUGHLY ELABORATED. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION
OF DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS IS ONLY ONE SPECIFIC
QUESTION, AND CONCENTRATION ON THIS AND SIMILAR QUESTIONS
ESSENTIALLY LEADS US ASIDE FROM THE SOLUTION OF THE
ENTIRE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL PROHIBITION OF LETHAL
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH A
MAXIMAL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO ACCOMMODATE THE
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WISHES OF THE U.S. SIDE, WE WOULD CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE

TO EXCHANGE OPINIONS ON THIS MATTER.

WE MAKE A PROPOSAL TO THE U.S. SIDE THAT, DURING
THE SUMMER SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, WE
HAVE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS IN GENEVA ON THE LEVEL
OF U.S.S.R. AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMMITTEE,
WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF EXPERTS, ON THE QUESTION OF
OUR JOINT INITIATIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROHIBITION OF
THE MOST DANGEROUS, LETHAL CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE.
END TEXT. KISSINGER

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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